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echnology has made a substantial impact on
gambling over the past decade. Consequently,
online gambling has seen major growth via the
availability and convenience of the internet and
through innovative technology that has made remote
gambling possible. Online gambling provides convenience and
the ability to gamble from home and the workplace (Griffiths,
2009a). The rapid expansion in internet gambling has meant
that gambling regulation has often lagged behind. For
instance, online gambling and the lack of regulation at a
European Union level has opened the possibility for gambling
business to be offered to consumers from remote locations.
An illustration of this is the large number of gambling
operators that reside in Malta where these operators abide
by license requirements which are imposed by the local
Maltese authority, rendering borderless gambling possible
(Auer & Griffiths, 2013a).
This raises concerns about both increased gambling availability
and consumer protection. However, new technology has given
rise to innovative ways in protecting online gamblers (Harris &
Griffiths, 2017). Despite internet gambling often being seen
negatively due to its high accessibility and convenience because
it may increase the occurrence of problem gambling due to
higher gambling exposure (Griffiths et al., 2009), research
suggests that online gambling providers can offer superior, more
accessible and tailored responsible gambling tools (Harris &
Griffiths, 2017).
Through the growth of online gambling, new opportunities
have arisen to analyse data for consumer protection, which in
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turn may be used by different stakeholders such as academics,
gaming operators, regulators, and policymakers (Griffiths &
Whitty, 2010). This has raised a further argument that consumer
protection and the behavioural tracking of online players may
cause tensions for the gambling provider because the
commercial interests may supersede the operator’s responsible
gambling interests (Jones, et al., 2009). However, this consumer
monitoring is not something novel for the industry because it
has previously been used (and still is) for marketing
segmentation and risk management (Dragicevic, et al., 2011).
Furthermore, being able to help and tailor responsible gambling
approaches for the consumer is key to risk management
because mishandling of responsible gambling issues may raise
problems for the operator with the regulator that may incur
financial and reputational risks (Stradbrooke, 2016). One
example of this, can be seen in the United Kingdom where the
Gambling Commission has fined gambling operators for failing
consumer protection and has also taken action against the
individuals who were responsible for these failings (Gambling
Commission, 2018).
Increasingly, regulatory requirements have focused upon
providing consumers with responsible gambling features such
as being able to choose and activate deposit, time, and
monetary loss limits, and voluntary self-exclusion (VSE) options
(Dragicevic, et al., 2015; Harris & Griffiths, 2017). VSE is an
essential tool offered by gambling operators that is designed to
limit access to gambling opportunities in both land-based
gambling venues and online gambling websites for
predetermined periods of time (Dragicevic, et al., 2015).
Research conducted on 30 major gambling operators just as
online gambling was starting to take off noted that 29 of them
showed no evidence that gamblers could access such a feature
as VSE (Smeaton & Griffiths, 2004). However, this has changed
over recent years because responsible gambling has increased
in importance, and jurisdictional regulators are imposing more
pressure by requiring gambling operators to have player
protection measures in place before the issuing of an operating
license and the maintenance of one. In 2017, we carried out a
similar study to that of Smeaton and Griffiths where we
examined the websites of 50 leading online gambling operators
and reported that 86% of the operators were offering VSE. Some
allowed activation of VSE online, whereas other operators
allowed VSE by contacting the operator’s customer service
department (Bonello & Griffiths, 2017). 
An additional tool that is unique to online gambling (as
opposed to land-based venues unless they require a player card
to gamble) is the possibility of monitoring and logging
consumers’ activity at minimal costs for the operator (Griffiths,
2009b; Griffiths & Whitty, 2010). This goes hand-in-hand with
the increased consideration displayed by the online gambling
operators, and the regulators that are advocating harm
minimisation (Percy, et al., 2016). According to Adami, et al.
(2013), by analysing risk factors utilising online gambling data,
online operators have the possibility to give better feedback to
the consumers who in turn can make more informed decisions
about how they gamble. Through this proactive approach,
operators achieve a greater chance to reduce and prevent
gambling-related harm. Moreover, this availability of
behavioural player data allows researchers to examine whether
such protective measures are effective. Despite this, one of the
greatest limitations is how to interpret such data to its fullest,
particularly in relation to gambling intensity and the early
detection of possible online problem gambling (Griffiths,
2009b). 
In a simulation study of 300,000 gamblers, Auer et al. (2012)
developed a measure to assess gambling intensity to which they
refer to as ‘theoretical loss’ which is done by simply multiplying
stake size by the probability of winning. This was then tested by
Auer and Griffiths (2014) on a real sample of 100,000 online
gamblers and they demonstrated theoretical loss is a robust and
reliable measure of gambling intensity. The measure has
subsequently been used to evaluate the effectiveness of various
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responsible gambling tools including limit setting features (Auer
& Griffiths, 2013b), loss-limit reminders (Auer, Hopfgartner &
Griffiths, 2018), and personalized feedback (Auer & Griffiths,
2015, 2016). 
A study by Haefeli, et al. (2011) examined customer
communication leading to VSE by online gamblers in order to
determine whether there were behavioural indicators for online
problem gamblers. The study found that customer
correspondence, such as the frequency of customer service
contacts, and tonality of the emails were useful predictors for
online gambling problems. This was an innovative way of
examining problem gambling because online operators use
online customer communication as a cost-effective measure to
reduce face-to-face customer contacts. Dragicevic, et al. (2015)
analysed de-identified player data from GTECH G2 (an internet
gambling software provider) and found that voluntary self-
excluders suffered greater losses and played a larger variety of
games when compared to a control group. This study provided
the opportunity of analysing consumer data across different
operators because other studies have been limited to data from
one gambling provider only. However, most online gambling
operators have more than one gambling software provider,
therefore the data might have been limited from another
perspective in that not all account information might have been
available for analysis. 
Research carried out in collaboration with Bwin Interactive
has analysed data from gamblers participating in online sports
betting. LaBrie et al. (2007) analysed the data of heavily involved
gamblers who had registered with the operator in February
2005. Although this may provide possible indicators of problem
gambling, being heavily involved in gambling may not always
mean that the behaviour is problematic because this is
dependent upon other social and economic factors, including
disposable income and the sporting teams they support
(because specific gamblers might gamble more if the team they
support is playing).
Another study using data from the same gambling operator
examined the first 90 days of gambler activity in order to
determine possible problem gambling indicators. This showed
that the highest betting activity was observed in the beginning
of the account registration and was followed by a gradual
decrease. This research also indicated that there was an episodic
increase in betting activity approximately every seven days
(LaPlante, et al., 2008). Although this might provide information
about the gambling behaviour for online gamblers, there are
other issues that must be taken into account. Primarily, the
initial days with a gambling operator is unlikely to be the
gambler’s initial betting activity overall because these gamblers
are likely to have been playing with other operators prior to
registering with Bwin Interactive. Secondly, higher initial betting
activity may also be due to gamblers exploring the website and
trying out different gambling opportunities provided by the
operator, or due to the fact that most operators give acquisition
bonuses which must be used within a specific time period after
registration. The increase in the betting activity every seven days
is likely to be due to the availability of sporting events to bet
upon because there is typically a higher occurrence of sporting
events to bet on at weekends. 
Haeusler (2016) evaluated behavioural data of 2,696 real-
money gamblers by exploring payment transactions of gamblers
who used VSE. The results showed an inconsistency of
withdrawal amounts (i.e., switching between very high and very
low withdrawal amounts) and may be viewed as a possible
online problem gambling indicator. Using payment data to
identify a problem gambling indicator might be innovative but
not all gamblers who choose VSE are using this option due to
problem gambling behaviour with the operator or overall
(Griffiths & Auer, 2016). In fact, it was observed by Haeusler that
23.3% of those who had used VSE in January 2015, had no
deposit payment at all in 2014 with that specific operator. This
may be due to the gambler self-excluding because of problem
gambling with another operator, or simply due to annoyance
with the current operator they had registered for (Griffiths &
Auer, 2016). 
In another study to identify possible behavioural markers of
problem gambling, gamblers who actively used responsible
gambling interventions were examined (Gray, et al., 2012).
These interventions included, amongst others, gamblers
reporting a problem, changing of money limits, partial account
blocks, complaints about fair play, and cancelling payment
withdrawals. The study also showed that those using
responsible gambling tools had significantly more gambling
activity across different products. Although this gives a possible
indication of problem gamblers’ activity, these responsible
gambling events only considered gamblers who had contacted
customer service. This excludes online gamblers who might be
too ashamed or did not wish to contact customer service. In
another study using Bwin Interactive data, individuals who used
a web-based account closure system were analysed (Xuan &
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Shaffer, 2009). This is arguably a better way to study behavioural
indicators for problem gambling using gambler data because it
provides a more representative gambler sample who are
utilizing preventive tools in their online gambling activity. This
study showed that just prior to closing their account, gamblers
had increasing losses and chased losses through higher stakes
on less risky bets. The higher amount of money risked and
increasing losses were also evident in problem gambling account
closures in another study by LaBrie and Shaffer (2011). 
VSE has been used as a proxy measure for problematic
gambling in previous studies (e.g., Percy, et al., 2016; Braverman
& Shaffer, 2012; Haefeli, et al., 2011; LaBrie & Shaffer, 2011).
The problem with using this proxy measure is that VSE –
especially in the online gambling environment – may not always
be the best measure to use as an indicator for problem gambling
(Griffiths & Auer, 2016). Despite studies examining gambling
activity prior to VSE, there is little published empirical research
on the effectiveness of it for online gamblers. LaBrie and Shaffer
(2010) used VSE as a proxy measure for problem gambling due
to evidence from previous land-based studies. Ladouceur et al.
(2000) showed that the majority of self-excluders in the land-
based casinos met the clinical criteria for gambling disorder.
Nonetheless, online gambling is psychologically and structurally
different from land-based gambling in many respects such as
increased disinhibition and perceived anonymity which can
negatively impact gambling behaviour as well as evidence
showing online environments can impair decision-making
judgments and increase impulsivity (Griffiths, 2003). 
As highlighted by Griffiths and Auer (2016), VSE is not
necessarily a good proxy measure for at-risk or problem
gamblers because there is no proof of a direct relationship and
online gamblers display several other reasons for self-excluding.
In fact, the research by Dragicevic et al. (2015) showed that a
large proportion of online gamblers self-exclude within the first
15 days of activity, with 25% self-excluding within the same day
of account registration. This could be due to gamblers
experimenting and evaluating the online gambling operator, or
the sign-up bonuses not being up to the gambler’s expectations
(and therefore, VSE having nothing to do with problem
gambling). Online VSE does not appear to have the same stigma
and bureaucracy associated in the land-based setting
(Dragicevic, et al., 2015). Moreover, it must be kept in mind that
by self-excluding from one operator, this does not mean the
individual cannot gamble online. A gambler may self-exclude
from one operator and within a few minutes be registered
and/or gambling with another one. 
Although behavioural prediction may provide (i) individual
player protection and interventions tailored to the gambler’s
needs (Haeusler, 2016), and (ii) data objectivity due to very large
sample sizes (Auer & Griffiths, 2014), there may be a greater
need to actually understand gambler activity without the
predisposition of affirming problematic gambling utilising VSE.
Primarily, VSE only covers one part of the spectrum of gamblers’
behaviour (Haeusler, 2016). Furthermore, VSE – particularly
short-term VSE, also referred to as time-outs under the UK
license – may be used as a responsible gambling measure rather
than a problem gambling prevention measure as demonstrated
in a survey study of almost 2500 Swedish gamblers by Griffiths,
et al. (2009). In a study by Hayer and Meyer (2011), the reasons
for VSE were explored. Although most indicated potential
problem gambling as a reason for self-excluding, such as losing
too much money gambling (51.7%) or spending too much time
gambling (35.5%), 26.3% of the self-excluders did so due to
simply being annoyed with the gambling operator. In fact, online
gambling provides very quick and easy access to responsible
gambling tools, including VSE (Philander & MacKay, 2014), and
so this might make it easier for someone to self-exclude for
reasons that have nothing to do with responsible gambling or
problem gambling. 
This should not be interpreted that online gambling
operators should make VSE or any other responsible gambling
tool harder to access, but potentially to look at better ways of
preventing the misuse of VSE. Moreover, this should always be
considered when examining the activity of self-excluded
gamblers to determine behavioural indicators of possible
problem gamblers. There is a high chance that by examining VSE
only to determine risk indicators, the gambling operator is either
examining a limited group (i.e., not all problem gamblers) or
gamblers with no problem gambling-related experience.
Providing tailored help and attempting early detection of
problem gambling will help players to regulate their gambling.
This will lead to more sustainable long-term revenue for the
gambling operator (Percy, et al., 2016). ::CGi
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